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Abstract
We examine the eﬀects of restructuring electricity markets on ca-
pacity investments, retail prices and welfare when demand is uncer-
tain. We study the following market conﬁgurations: (i) integrated
monopoly, (ii) integrated duopoly with wholesale trade, and (iii) sep-
arated duopoly with wholesale trade. Assuming that wholesale prices
can react to changes in retail prices (but not vice versa), we ﬁnd that
generators install suﬃcient capacity to serve retail demand in each
market conﬁguration, thus avoiding blackouts. Furthermore, aggre-
gate capacity levels and retail prices are such that the separated (inte-
grated) duopoly with wholesale trade performs best (worst) in terms
of welfare.
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Electricity markets around the world have recently been reformed in an ef-
fort to improve their economic performance. In many countries, legislators
have allowed competition into statutory, vertically integrated monopoly and
implemented regulations such as vertical unbundling or vertical separation to
prevent harmful strategic behavior.1 Yet, this reform process is far from com-
plete, and there is no consensus that a single model is best (Pittman, 2003).
In particular, there is a concern that introducing competition into electricity
markets may undermine infrastructure investments (see, e.g., Joskow (2006),
and Joskow and Tirole (2007)).
In this paper, we provide a novel analytical framework for studying the ef-
fects of restructuring electricity markets on capacity investments, prices, and
welfare, allowing for uncertain demand. In doing so, we contribute to an
extensive literature on the eﬀect of uncertain demand on capacity choices.2
The key diﬀerence to this literature is that we explicitly account for the role
of vertical market structure in determining investments, prices, and welfare.
More speciﬁcally, we study diﬀerent conﬁgurations of an electricity market
that vary with respect to (a) the vertical structure and (b) the extent to
which ﬁrms compete.
In our setting, both capacity decisions and retail prices are determined before
the state of retail demand is known. After retail demand is realized, the
wholesale price for electricity is determined in a wholesale auction due to
von der Fehr and Harbord (1997) and (1993), and deliveries and payments
are exchanged. It is crucial to note that, as a consequence, wholesale prices
may react to changes in retail prices, whereas retail prices cannot reﬂect
changes in wholesale prices. This is in marked contrast to standard models
of vertically-related industries, where retail prices are assumed to react to
changes in wholesale prices, but not vice versa. Finally, in the event that
1In the UK, for example, the industry was vertically separated into three generating
ﬁrms, the National Grid company, and 2 regional distribution companies by the Electricity
Act in 1989. Some regional distribution companies, however, integrated vertically into
generation later on (Newbery, 1999, 2005). The Californian restructuring bill from 1996
also forced the regulated utilities to sell lots of their generation facilities (Borenstein, 2002).
The European Union ruled in its Directive 2003/54/EC concerning common rules for the
internal market in electricity adopted on 26 June 2003 that electricity generating ﬁrms
which are also integrated into the transmission and distribution of electricity have to be
functionally disintegrated.
2See, e.g., Drèze and Sheshinski (1976), Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997), von der Fehr
and Harbord (1997), Castro-Rodriguez et al. (2001), Boom (2002) and (2003), Borenstein
and Holland (2005)), Murphy and Smeers (2005), and Grimm and Zoettl (2006).
1supply and demand cannot be balanced, a blackout occurs, and trade breaks
down.
To analyze the competitive eﬀects of alternative approaches towards restruc-
turing electricity, we consider the following distinct market conﬁgurations:
(i) integrated monopoly
(ii) integrated duopoly with wholesale trade,
(iii) separated duopoly with wholesale trade.
For each of these conﬁgurations, we keep both the vertical market structure
and the number of competitors in generation and retailing ﬁxed for simplicity.
Our main results are the following. First, capacity investments are highest
under integrated duopoly and lowest under integrated monopoly. The sep-
arated duopoly yields an intermediate level of capacity. Intuitively, the re-
sult follows from the introduction of (imperfect) competition into integrated
monopoly, which requires ﬁrms to make strategic investment and pricing de-
cisions. In particular, an integrated ﬁrm faces the risk of being unable to
serve its own retail demand, so that it must buy electricity from its competi-
tor, which completely dissipates its rent. To avoid this unfavorable outcome,
an integrated duopolist will choose both a high level of capacity and a high
retail price. Vertically separating the industry eliminates the risk of rent
dissipation from insuﬃcient capacity, since vertically separated generators
are not committed to serve a speciﬁc amount of retail demand. That is,
vertical separation reduces the investment-enhancing eﬀect of introducing
competition into integrated monopoly, but does not fully eliminate it.
Second, retail prices are lowest under separated duopoly and highest under
integrated duopoly. The integrated monopoly yields an intermediate level
of retail prices. To understand this result, note that—in contrast to the
standard literature—an increase of the wholesale prices does not increase the
retail price: Since both the retail price and retail demand are ﬁxed when the
wholesale price is determined, wholesale prices simply serve to split proﬁts
between generators and retailers. It is thus natural to expect that introducing
competition at the retail level reduces retail prices. However, this will happen
only if ﬁrms are vertically separated. If ﬁrms are integrated, the risk of rent
dissipation discussed above leads competitors to set prices that are higher
than under integrated monopoly. That is, at least in our setting, vertical
separation is required for assuring that restructuring leads to a reduction of
retail prices.
2Third, the combined eﬀects of restructuring on investments and retail prices
are such that social welfare is highest under separated duopoly and lowest
under integrated duopoly. The integrated monopoly yields an intermediate
level of social welfare. The intuition for this result is straightforward: Since,
irrespective of market conﬁguration, total capacity is always large enough to
serve retail demand at the relevant market price (i.e., blackouts do not occur
in equilibrium), low levels of investment do not pose a problem from the wel-
fare perspective. In fact, higher capacity investments tend to decrease rather
than increase welfare, as they increase generation costs without boosting sup-
ply security. The only possibility for higher capacity investments to increase
welfare is by way of higher retail demand being served without blackouts.
Yet, for this to occur, retail prices must decrease, which happens only with
restructuring from integrated monopoly to separated duopoly. Therefore, the
welfare ranking is essentially a reversed ranking of the price levels under the
various industry conﬁgurations.
In sum, our ﬁndings support the view that restructuring electricity may lead
to welfare increases. Moreover, they highlight the subtle role of vertical
market structure in attaining such welfare increases: Due to the speciﬁcs of
the electricity industry—wholesale markets clear after retail markets, and
wholesale prices are often determined using auctions—the standard results
from the literature on vertically related industries do not easily carry over to
electricity.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the
analytical framework. Section 3 analyzes the case of integrated monopoly.
Sections 4 and 5 provide the equilibrium outcomes under separated and in-
tegrated duopoly, respectively. Section 6 compares the equilibrium outcomes
and provides a discussion of the intuition for our results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Analytical Framework
In this section, we outline the analytical framework for the various market
conﬁgurations considered below.
Demand
We ﬁrst consider retail demand. Suppose that the retail customers’ surplus
function is given by




3where x ¸ 0 is the amount of electricity consumed, r ¸ 0 is the retail market
price per unit of electricity, and " is a demand shock, uniformly distributed on
the interval [0;1]: Maximizing V (x;";r) with respect to x yields the following
retail demand for electricity
x(r;") = maxf1 + " ¡ r;0g: (2)
If there is more than one retailer, retail customers subscribe to the retailer
oﬀering the lowest retail price, as electricity is a homogeneous good. If the
prices oﬀered by the retailers are identical, consumers choose each retailer
with equal probability.
Supply
We consider the following three market conﬁgurations that diﬀer in terms of
the number of active ﬁrms and the industry’s vertical structure:3
(i) integrated monopoly;
(ii) integrated duopoly with wholesale trade, i.e., two integrated ﬁrms that
are allowed to buy and sell electricity on the wholesale market;
(iii) separated duopoly with wholesale trade, i.e., two generators selling to the
wholesale market and two retailers buying from the wholesale market.
For simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of generating electricity
is constant and normalized to zero. The total cost of electricity generator
i = A;B is thus given by
C(ki) = zki; (3)
where z is the constant unit cost of capacity and ki the generating capacity
installed by ﬁrm i.4 Moreover, we assume that the marginal cost of selling
electricity to retail customers is constant and normalized to zero
3For reasons that will become clear below, we abstract from the possibility of a chain
of (vertically separated) monopolies.
4Firm indices may be ignored in the case of integrated monopoly where we have only
one generator.
4Timing
The timing of our analysis is motivated by the speciﬁcs of the electricity
industry. We ﬁrst consider the two duopoly models, which consist of the
following ﬁve stages:
(1) In the ﬁrst stage, electricity generators i = A;B decide on their capac-
ity levels ki before the level of retail demand is known. In the integrated
duopoly, we assume that capacity decisions are taken simultaneously.
In the separated duopoly, we also analyze sequential investment deci-
sions, where generator A gets to decide before generator B.
(2) In the second stage, retailers ` = C;D simultaneously oﬀer retail prices
r` in the separated duopoly case, whereas generators i = A;B simulta-
neously oﬀer retail prices ri in the integrated duopoly case. Consumers
buy from the ﬁrm with the lower retail price, or, if prices are identical,
from each ﬁrm with probability one half.
(3) In the third stage, the demand shock " 2 [0;1] is realized. Since retail
prices are already determined, this implies that retail demand is ﬁxed
for the remaining stages.
(4) In the fourth stage, generators A and B submit price bids pA and pB
for their full capacity ki;i = A;B to an auctioneer. The auctioneer
then determines the market clearing wholesale price p (if any) and the
amount of electricity each generator may supply to the grid.
(5) Finally, in the ﬁfth stage, if supply and demand cannot be balanced, a
blackout occurs, and there is no exchange deliveries and payments. If
supply and demand can be balanced, retail customers are served and
both retailers and generators receive their respective payments.
The timing in the integrated monopoly case reﬂects the timing in the duopoly
scenarios as closely as possible. Therefore the monopoly ﬁrm chooses its
capacity and its retail price before the uncertainty concerning the demand
level is resolved. Note that the wholesale price is irrelevant for the outcome
under integrated monopoly, as it solely allocates proﬁts to upstream and
downstream facilities.
5The Role of the Wholesale Price
We want to emphasize that, in our setting, the retail price is determined be-
fore the wholesale price. This is in marked contrast to the standard literature
on vertically related industries, where the timing is reversed. The diﬀerence
is motivated by the special characteristics of the electricity industry, where
retailers typically specify the terms of delivering electricity before demand is
known and then buy electricity on behalf of their customers on the whole-
sale market. That is, the retail market clears in the long run, whereas the
wholesale market clears in the short run. This implies, in particular, that
the wholesale price is a function of the retail price, whereas the retail price
cannot react to changes in the wholesale price. As a result, the chain of mo-
nopolies is not a sensible structure: The upstream monopolist would always
be able to fully extract the downstream monopolist’s proﬁt by setting the
wholesale price equal to the retail price determined in the previous stage.5
The retail monopolist would thus be indiﬀerent between all admissible retail
prices, leaving the equilibrium outcome indeterminate.
Even though the wholesale price does not aﬀect the retail price, it remains
crucial for the outcome in the various market conﬁgurations, as it aﬀects the
returns on investment for electricity generators. For the sake of concreteness,
we assume that the wholesale price is determined according to a unit price
auction introduced by von der Fehr and Harbord (1997) and (1993).6 Unit
price auctions were used for the Electricity Pool in England and Wales before
the reform in 2001, and are still in use elsewhere, e.g. for the Nord Pool in
Scandinavia, or the Spanish wholesale market.7
The unit price auction we employ requires each ﬁrm i to bid a price pi at
which it is willing to supply its total capacity.8 The auctioneer will then
try to balance supply and demand on the grid.9 To do so, he arranges
the bids in ascending order and determines the marginal bid that is just
5This particular form of a price squeeze is possible as retailers must commit to a retail
price before the wholesale price is determined.
6An alternative approach, based on Klemperer and Meyer (1989), has been suggested
by Green and Newbery (1992). They assume that ﬁrms bid diﬀerentiable supply functions,
whereas von der Fehr and Harbord (1997) and (1993) assume that they bid step functions.
See Vives (2007) for a recent contribution.
7See Bergman et al. (1999), Crampes and Fabra (2005) and Newbery (2005).
8That is, we abstract from the problem of strategic capacity withholding (see Crampes
and Creti (2001), and Le Coq (2002).
9For simplicity, we ignore transmission constraints, although they might interact with
constraints in the generating capacity. See Wilson (2002) for insights into this problem
and for the analysis of isolated transmission constraints Borenstein et al. (2000), Joskow
and Tirole (2000) and Léautier (2001)
6necessary to equate supply and demand. The price of the marginal bid is
the spot market price that is payed to all generators for each unit that is
dispatched on the grid (irrespective of the bids made by these generators).10
The capacity of suppliers bidding below the spot market price is dispatched
completely, whereas the marginal supplier delivers exactly the amount of
electricity necessary to balance supply and demand. If the supplied capacity
at a certain bid price is insuﬃcient to satisfy demand, but would be more
than suﬃcient to satisfy demand at the next higher bid price, the auctioneer
sets the spot market price in between the two bid prices so as to balance
supply and demand.11
Blackouts
Since neither retail demand nor generating capacity can respond to changes
in the wholesale price, the auctioneer may be unable to ﬁnd a wholesale price
that equates supply and demand. If there is no market-clearing wholesale
price, a blackout occurs, where the delivery of electricity breaks down and all
ﬁrms realize zero proﬁts.12 This assumption maximizes the punishment for
the generators if their aggregate capacity is too small, thus also maximizing
the incentive to install capacity. For the sake of simplicity we abstract from
the fact that in reality ﬁrms compete repeatedly on the wholesale and on the
retail market.13 Under separated duopoly, a blackout will also occur if the
wholesale price is larger than the retail price (p > r). In this case, retailers
must declare bankruptcy and exit the market, so that generators can no
longer sell electricity.
We now proceed to the analysis of the equilibrium outcomes in the various
market conﬁgurations. We begin with the benchmark case of integrated
monopoly.
10Note the diﬀerence to Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), where the undercutting ﬁrm
receives its own price per unit sold even if its capacity is too low to serve the market, so
that some customers have to pay the price of the competitor with the next higher price.
11In line with Wilson (2002) we consider an integrated system because participation in
the auction is compulsory if a generating ﬁrm wants to sell electricity.
12Thus, we abstract from any sort of rationing by the auctioneer or the retailers of
electricity. See Joskow and Tirole (2004) for an analysis of a market where retailers
propose not only prices to consumers but also rationing rules which they want to apply.
Although in reality domestic consumers are sometimes rationed, the rationing rules are
usually not spelled out in any sort of contract with their retailers.
13Therefore collusion which has been analyzed by Fabra (2003) and by Dechenaux and
Kovenock (2005) for the wholesale market is out of the scope of this analysis.
73 Integrated Monopoly
Consider the pricing and investment decisions of a vertically integrated mono-
poly. Recall that, in this case, there is no wholesale market for electricity.
That is, the monopolist simply chooses the retail price rm and the capacity
level km so as to maximize expected proﬁts
¼(r;k) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
R 1
maxfr¡1;0g r(1 + " ¡ r)d" ¡ zk; if r ¸ 2 ¡ k;
R k¡1+r
maxfr¡1;0g r(1 + " ¡ r)d" ¡ zk; if maxf0;1 ¡ kg · r < 2 ¡ k;
¡zk; if r < maxf0;1 ¡ kg:
The ﬁrst element of ¼(r;k) is relevant when the retail price r is large enough
that demand is always smaller than capacity, even for the highest possible
demand shock " = 1.14 The second element is relevant when r is in an
intermediate range, such that demand is smaller than capacity for the lowest
possible demand shock " = 0 and larger than capacity for the highest possible
demand shock " = 1.15 Finally, the third element is relevant if the retail
price is low enough that demand is always larger than capacity (even for the
smallest possible demand shock " = 0).
Our ﬁrst result summarizes the outcome under integrated monopoly.
Proposition 1 (integrated monopoly) For capacity costs z · 1=2, the
















For capacity costs z > 1=2, the integrated monopoly is not sustainable, as
¼(rm;km) < 0.
Proof: Boom (2003).
Intuitively, Proposition 1 states that a (sustainable) proﬁt-maximizing in-
tegrated monopoly will choose both the retail price and its capacity so as
to avoid blackouts. Moreover, the outcome has two intuitive properties: (i)
The retail price increases in the cost of capacity; (ii) The installed capacity
decreases in the cost of capacity.
14In this case, the condition k ¸ (1 + " ¡ r) becomes equal to r ¸ 2 ¡ k. The lower
bound of the integral assures a positive demand.
15The former requires r ¸ maxf0;1 ¡ kg, and the latter r < 2 ¡ k. The upper bound
of the integral assures that a black-out does not occur, i.e. capacity is suﬃcient to satisfy
demand.
84 Separated Duopoly (2£2 Firms)
Consider now a market conﬁguration with two vertically separated generators
and retailers, respectively. As usual, we employ backwards induction to
characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Given the timing
described in Section 2, we ﬁrst consider the wholesale market. Next, we study
the retail market. Finally, we analyze the investment decisions of electricity
generators.
4.1 Wholesale Market
The wholesale price is determined in unit-price auction according to
p(pA;pB) = pi
½
if pi < pj and ki ¸ x(r¤;") or
if pi ¸ pj and kj < x(r¤;") · kA + kB; (5)
provided that the generators’ combined capacities are suﬃciently large to
satisfy retail demand at the equilibrium retail price (kA + kB ¸ x(r¤;")). If
the combined capacity is insuﬃcient to satisfy demand (kA + kB < x(r¤;")),
the auctioneer cannot ﬁnd a wholesale price equating supply and demand,
and a blackout occurs.
The price bids pA and pB also determine the volume of electricity that gen-
erator i = A;B can sell, which is given by
yi(pA;pB) =
8
> > > <
> > > :




2 if pi = pj;
maxf0;x(r¤;") ¡ kjg if pi > pj;
(6)
with i;j = A;B and i 6= j. Thus, using (5) and (6), the proﬁt of generator
i = A;B at this stage of the game is
¼i(pA;pB) = p(pA;pB)yi(pA;pB):
Since the ﬁrms’ bidding behavior in our setting is equivalent to that derived
by Crampes and Creti (2001) and Le Coq (2002) for given capacity levels,
we omit the details here. Intuitively, best response price bidding requires
each ﬁrm to either undercut the rival or bid the maximum price pi = r¤ at
which retailers’ proﬁts are non-negative. Our next proposition characterizes
the resulting Nash equilibria in price bids.
9Proposition 2 (wholesale prices) Depending on the capacity levels (kA;kB)
and the retail price r¤, there are the following types of Nash equilibria in price
bids:
(i) If kA + kB < x(r¤;"), any pair (pA;pB) forms a Nash equilibrium in
price bids. No wholesale price can equate supply and demand, and a
blackout occurs.
(ii) If ki ¸ x(r¤;") > kj, with i;j = A;B and i 6= j, the Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies is characterised by pi = r¤ and pj < r¤(x(r¤;")¡kj)=ki.
The resulting equilibrium wholesale price is p¤ = r¤, and ﬁrms sell the
quantities yi = x(r¤;") ¡ kj and yj = kj.
(iii) If kA + kB ¸ x(r¤;") > maxfkA;kBg, there are two types of Nash
equilibria in pure strategies: one with pA = r¤ and pB < r¤(x(r¤;") ¡
kB)=kA, and another with pB = r¤ and pA < r¤(x(r¤;")¡kA)=kB. The
wholesale price is the same (p¤ = r¤) for both types of equilibria, but the
quantities sold in equilibrium diﬀer: in the former yA = x(r¤;") ¡ kB
and yB = kB, whereas in the latter yA = kA and yB = x(r¤;") ¡ kA.
(iv) If minfkA;kBg ¸ x(r¤;") the Nash equilibrium pA = pB = 0 is unique.
The resulting equilibrium wholesale price is p¤ = 0, and ﬁrms sell the
quantities yA = yB = x(r¤;")=2.
Proof: See appendix A of Le Coq (2002) or the proofs of proposition 1-
3 in Crampes and Creti (2001), using that the constant marginal cost of
generating electricity is identical and equal to zero by assumption, whereas
the maximum price with positive demand is p = r¤.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. Area A coincides with case (i),
where demand exceeds aggregate installed capacity, so that a blackout occurs.
Areas B and D are associated with case (ii): In area B, ﬁrm A is the large
ﬁrm, whereas ﬁrm B is the small ﬁrm; in D, these roles are reversed. In
both cases, the large ﬁrm bids the maximum price r¤, whereas the small
ﬁrm bids just low enough to avoid undercutting by the large ﬁrm. In area C,
which corresponds to case (iii), the diﬀerence in installed capacities is smaller
than in either B or D, and two types of equilibria are possible: Either the
large or the small ﬁrm bids the maximum price, and the other ﬁrm bids
low enough to avoid undercutting. In both cases the equilibrium wholesale
price is p¤ = r¤. Finally, area E corresponds to case (iv). Here, each ﬁrm’s
capacity is suﬃcent to satisfy aggregate demand. Therefore, price bidding

















Figure 1: Prices on the Wholesale Market
Note that there are multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria for cases (i)–(iii),
as any lower bid that avoids both undercutting and negative proﬁts is admis-
sible. These equilibria are pay-oﬀ equivalent for cases (i) and (ii), but not
for case (iii), where the volume of dispatched electricity yi(pA;pB) depends
on the type of equilibrium played. To deal with this problem, we introduce
the following assumption:16
Assumption 1 If capacities satisfy kA+kB ¸ x(r¤;") > maxfkA;kBg, gen-
erators coordinate on the Nash equilibrium where the large-capacity ﬁrm bids
the maximum price and the small-capacity ﬁrm bids low enough to avoid un-
dercutting by the large ﬁrm. If generators have equal capacities, they play
each type of equilibrium with equal probability.
16There are indications that imposing this assumption is equivalent to applying the
criterion of risk-dominance.
114.2 Retail Market
Let us ﬁrst note that for retailers to obtain non-negative proﬁts, the demand
shock " must satisfy
" > r ¡ 1 ´ " and " · minfkA;kBg + r ¡ 1 ´ ¹ ";
where " denotes the critical value below which demand is negative, and " is
the maximum value for which the generating capacities are large enough in
order to ensure competitive outcomes on the wholesale market and no shift
of rents from the retailers to the generators. With this in mind, and recalling
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maxf0;"g r`(1 + " ¡ r`)d" if r` = rt;
R maxf0;minf¹ ";1gg
maxf0;"g r`(1 + " ¡ r`)d" if r` < rt;
(7)
with `;t = C;D, and ` 6= t. Equation (7) indicates that retailers undercut
each other until they reach zero proﬁts. Therefore, the following proposition
holds:
Proposition 3 (retail prices) Depending on the capacity levels (kA;kB),
there are the following subgame perfect Nash equilibria in retail prices.
(i) If minfkA;kBg ¸ 1 there is a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
with rC = rD = 0.
(ii) If minfkA;kBg < 1 all Nash equilibria in pure strategies are charac-
terised by rC · 1 ¡ minfkA;kBg and rD · 1 ¡ minfkA;kBg.
Proof: Suppose that r` > rt with `;t = C;D and ` 6= t. This can only be an
equilibrium, if rt · 1¡minfkA;kBg and r` · 1¡minfkA;kBg, because oth-
erwise ﬁrm ` can increase its proﬁts by undercutting and ﬁrm t by increasing
its price. Suppose, alternatively, that r` = rt, then either r` = rt = 0 must
hold, if minfkA;kBg ¸ 1, or r` = rt < 1 ¡ minfkA;kBg, if minfkA;kBg < 1,
because otherwise each retailer can double its proﬁt by slightly undercutting
its rival.
It is important to note that retailers cannot realize positive proﬁt because
of Bertrand competition, no matter whether the equilibrium is unique (case
12(i)) or not (case (ii)). To deal with the multiplicity problem in case (ii), we
introduce the following assumption regarding equilibrium selection:
Assumption 2 If minfkA;kBg < 1, retailers choose the Nash equilibrium
with rC = rD = 1 ¡ minfkA;kBg.
Assumption 2 requires the retailers to select the equilibrium where they both
choose the highest possible price generating zero proﬁts.
4.3 Capacity Investments
Generators i = A;B decide on their capacities ki, anticipating the eﬀects on
the retail and the wholesale market. Recall that Bertrand competition on
the retail market shifts potential rents to electricity generators. Therefore,




¤ = maxf0;1 ¡ minfkA;kBgg: (8)
With a strictly positive price r¤, market demand is characterized by x(r¤;") =
1+"¡1+minfkA;kBg = "+minfkA;kBg. Therefore, generator i’s expected
proﬁts are given by
¦i(ki;kj) =
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
maxf0;1 ¡ kjg
R minf1;kig








¡zki if ki = kj;
maxf0;1 ¡ kig
R minf1;kjg
0 kid" ¡ zki if ki < kj;
(9)
with i;j = A;B and i 6= j.17 To understand (9), assume minfkA;kBg < 1
and x(r¤;") · kA + kB, and ﬁrst consider the case where ki > kj. In this
case, ﬁrm i bids high and serves the residual demand maxfx(r¤;")¡kj;0g =
maxf1 + " ¡ 1 + kj ¡ kj;0g = ". Next, consider the case where ki < kj:
Firm i now bids low and delivers its total capacity up to the level of demand,
that is minfki;1 + " ¡ 1 + kig = ki. Finally, if capacities are identical
(ki = kj), ﬁrm i bids both high and low with probability one half. As noted
above, the condition x(r¤;") · kA + kB must hold, since generators cannot
sell electricity in the event of a blackout. This condition is equivalent to
17With minfkA;kBg ¸ 1, the wholesale price is zero and none of the generators can
realize positive proﬁts.
13" + minfkA;kBg · kA + kB or " · maxfkA;kBg, if minfkA;kBg ¸ 1, which
explains the upper integration limit in (9).
It turns out that generator i’s best response is to choose a higher capacity
than its competitor, that is,
ki = 1 > kj;
if the competitor’s capacity is relatively low, and to choose a lower capacity,
ki = maxf0;minf(kj ¡ z)=(2kj);(1 ¡ z)=2gg;
if the rival’s capacity is relatively high.18 This is fairly natural because, if
the rival has a small capacity, both the residual demand served by the large-
capacity ﬁrm and the wholesale price are relatively large. Therefore, it pays
to install a large capacity. In contrast, if the rival’s capacity is relatively
large, it pays to install a small capacity, which is then completely sold, and
which supports a higher price on the wholesale market.
The next proposition summarizes the results for the case with simultaneous
capacity choices.
Proposition 4 (simultaneous capacity choices) With simultaneous ca-
pacity choices, the existence of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies is not guaranteed.
(i) If 0 · z < 1=3, there are two asymmetric subgame perfect Nash equi-
libria in pure strategies, with capacities k¤
i = 1 and k¤
j = (1 ¡ z)=2,
i;j = A;B and i 6= j.
(ii) If 1=3 · z < 1=2, there is no subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure
strategies.
(iii) If 1=2 · z, there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where
generators install no capacity.
Proof: Firm i’s best response functions are derived in Appendix A. Solving
for the intersections of ﬁrm i’s and ﬁrm j’s best responses in capacities yields
results (i)–(iii).
Figure 2 illustrates that, with simultaneous capacity choices and interme-
diate levels of capacity costs z, there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
This non-existence problem disappears, however, if capacities are chosen se-
quentially.










0 · z < 1=3 1=3 · z < 1=2
Figure 2: Best Responses in Capacities
Proposition 5 (sequential capacity choices) With sequential capacity
choices, the game always has a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
(i) If 0 · z < 1=3, there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies where ﬁrm A chooses k¤
A = (1¡z)=2 and ﬁrm B chooses
k¤
B = 1.
(ii) If 1=3 · z < 1=2, there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies where ﬁrm A chooses k¤
A = 1¡2z and ﬁrm B chooses
k¤
B = 1.
(iii) If 1=2 · z holds, there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies where generators install no capacity.
Proof: Substituting ﬁrm B’s best response function kB(kA), which is either
equivalent to (21) or (22), into ¦A(kA;kB) from (19) or (20) in Appendix A
and maximizing with respect to kA yields results (i)–(iii).
Note that the ﬁrst mover, generator A, prefers to be the small-capacity ﬁrm:
The small-capacity ﬁrm bids low and sells its total capacity, whereas the
15large-capacity ﬁrm, generator B, bids high, thereby determining the whole-
sale price, and serves only residual demand.
5 Integrated Duopoly
In this section, we brieﬂy review the results for the integrated duopoly with
wholesale trade analyzed in Boom (2003), which also contains further details
on this market conﬁguration (including the proofs omitted here).
5.1 Wholesale Market
In this conﬁguration, generators may trade with each other (rather than
with vertically separated retailers) on the wholesale market. When the unit
price auction is held, total market demand is ﬁxed and given by x(r+;"),
where r+ = minfrA;rBg denotes the equilibrium retail price under integrated





x(ri;") if ri < rj;
1
2x(ri;") if ri = rj;
0 if ri > rj;
; with i;j 2 fA;Bg;i 6= j: (10)
If aggregate capacity is suﬃcient to satisfy demand, i.e. kA + kB ¸ x(r+;"),
the wholesale price is given by equation (5), with r¤ replaced by r+. Similarly,
the volume of electricity generator i can sell is given by (6), with r¤ replaced
by r+. Thus, ﬁrm i’s revenues are
¼i(ri;rj) = ridi(ri;rj;") + p(pi;pj)[yi(pi;pj;") ¡ di(ri;rj;")]: (11)
Equation (11) states that an integrated generator earns its retail price ri
for each unit of electricity demanded by its subscribers, plus the wholesale
price p times the diﬀerence between the units dispatched to the grid and its
own retail demand. This implies, in particular, that an integrated generator
becomes a net payer in the wholesale market if its retail demand exceeds its
own capacity.
Our next proposition characterizes the resulting Nash equilibria in bid prices.
Proposition 6 (wholesale prices) Depending on the capacity levels (kA;kB)
and the retail demand x(minfrA;rBg;"), there are the following Nash equi-
libria in price bids:
16(i) If kA+kB < x(minfrA;rBg;"), a blackout occurs, and any pair (pA;pB)
forms a Nash equilibrium in price bids.
(ii) If kA +kB ¸ x(minfrA;rBg;") but one ﬁrm, say A; cannot satisfy own
retail demand, kA < dA(rA;rB;"), then bids satisfy pB = p(rA;rB;")










(iii) If ki ¸ di(rA;rB;") for i = A;B; the Nash equilibrium pA = pB = 0 is
unique. The resulting equilibrium wholesale price is p¤ = 0; and ﬁrms
earn revenues of ¼i(rA;rB) = ridi(rA;rB;"):
Proof: See Boom (2003), Appendix B.
Case (i) describes the case where aggregate capacity is insuﬃcient to serve
retail demand, so that a blackout is inevitable. In case (iii), both genera-
tors have suﬃcient capacity to serve their own retail demand, so that they
undercut each other until their bids equal zero, and revenues accrue only on
the retail market. Finally, in case (ii), generator A must buy electricity on
the wholesale market to serve its retail demand. Therefore, it cannot avoid
becoming a net payer in the wholesale auction. Generator A can reduce its
net demand position, however, by undercutting its competitor, i.e., bidding
a price pA that is low enough that B does not have an incentive to deviate
from the maximum price p. Yet, even after undercutting, B appropriates all
rents and the revenues of A are zero.
5.2 Retail Market
Deriving equilibrium retail prices under integrated duopoly is fairly tedious
(see Boom (2003)). We therefore conﬁne ourselves to brieﬂy discussing the
available pricing strategies and stating the results (without giving proofs).
In the retail market, each integrated generator has three strategies at its
disposal: First, it can undercut its rival and corner the market. This strategy
yields positive revenues only if the demand shock is such that retail demand
is positive and the undercutting generator’s capacity is suﬃciently large to
serve it. Second, it can match the price of its competitor, splitting total retail
17demand in half. Then, expected revenues depend on the relative capacities of
the two ﬁrms: For the smaller ﬁrm, revenues are as in the undercutting case,
except that it attracts only half the demand. For the ﬁrm with the larger
capacity, however, revenues are diﬀerent, as it can appropriate the rival’s rent
if its capacity is suﬃciently large to make up for a lack of capacity of the
smaller ﬁrm. Finally, it can set a higher price than its competitor, in which
case it will not get any subscribers. However, it will earn positive revenues if
the competitor cannot serve total retail demand and own capacity is suﬃcient
to make up for the diﬀerence.
Proposition 7 (retail prices) Depending on the level of capacities (kA;kB),
there are the following Nash equilibria in retail prices.
(i) If kA = kB = k <
p
5=2; the pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium results
in retail prices
r












4k2 ¡ 1) if 1 p




(ii) With not too asymmetric capacities, the unique Nash equilibrium results
in r+ = rA = rB = 0:
(iii) With asymmetric capacities and kB < maxf(kA ¡ 1)=2; 1
8g, the pareto-
dominant Nash equilibrium results in r+ = rA = maxf3
4;2¡kAg < rB.
(There is an analogous equilibrium where the roles of A and B are
exchanged.)
(iv) If 1
8 · kB < (kA ¡ 1)=2; the pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium results
in r+ = rA = rB = 1 ¡ 2kB: (There is an analogous equilibrium where
the roles of A and B are exchanged.)
(v) If kA + kB < 1; the equilibria cannot be pareto ranked, but they are
payoﬀ-equivalent as both ﬁrms realize zero revenues.
Proof: See Boom (2003), Appendix C.
5.3 Capacity Investments
Again, we brieﬂy discuss the available strategies and then state the result
without giving proofs (see Boom (2003) for details). If the competitor has a
18very low capacity, a ﬁrm can either choose a very large capacity and corner
the market, or it can match the competitor’s capacity to generate positive
revenues (for a smaller own capacity, revenues are zero). If the competitor’s
capacity is larger (but still relatively small), cornering the market is no longer
an option; positive revenues are still possible, however, for a capacity much
larger than that of the competitor. For a still larger capacity of the com-
petitor, positive revenues from installing a higher capacity are impossible.
Finally, for a very large competitor’s capacity, own revenues are independent
of own capacity. For later reference, we summarize the possible outcomes in
our next proposition.
Proposition 8 (capacity investments) Depending on the level of capac-
ity costs, there are the following pareto-dominant Nash equilibria.
(i) If 0 · z < 0:2118; there is a unique equilibrium where ﬁrms choose
capacity levels kA = kB = b k; with
b k = argmaxk
½







(ii) If 0:2118 · z · 1=(2
p
2); the equilibria that are not pareto-dominated
are characterized either by both ﬁrms choosing b k or by ﬁrm A choos-
ing the monopoly capacity km, deﬁned in Proposition 1, and ﬁrm B
choosing kB = 0 or vice versa.
(iii) If 1=(2
p
2) < z < 1
2; there are two equilibria with ﬁrm A choosing km
and ﬁrm B choosing kB = 0 or vice versa.
(iv) For z ¸ 1
2; there is a unique equilibrium where ﬁrms choose the capacity
levels kA = kB = 0:
Proof: See Boom (2003), Appendix C.
Proposition 8 indicates that uniqueness can only be achieved for low capacity
costs.
6 Comparing Market Conﬁgurations
In this section, we ﬁrst construct rankings of the various market conﬁgura-
tions in terms of capacities, retail prices and welfare. Second, we discuss how
our ﬁndings relate to the standard literature on vertically related industries.
196.1 Rankings
Capacities
We denote aggregate capacity by k+ = 2b k in the case of integrated duopoly,
by k¤ = k¤
A + k¤
B in the case of separated duopoly, and by km in the case of
integrated monopoly.
Proposition 9 (capacity ranking) Suppose that (i) capacity decisions are
either taken sequentially by the separated generators or that 0 · z · 1=3, and
(ii) that integrated generators co-ordinate on the pareto-dominant competitive





Proof: Follows from comparing Propositions 1, 5 and 8.
Proposition 9 states that capacity investments are highest under integrated
duopoly and lowest under integrated monopoly. The separated duopoly
yields an intermediate level of capacity.
To understand the intuition for this result, consider the investment incentive
of an integrated monopoly generator. Introducing another integrated gen-
erator implies that there is both wholesale and retail competition. Recall
that an integrated generator now faces the risk of being unable to serve its
retail demand, so that it must buy electricity from the competitor, which
completely dissipates its rent. To avoid such an outcome, integrated gen-
erators will invest more than under monpoly (k+ > km). Now, consider
the impact of vertical separation on the investment incentives of generators.
After vertical separation, generators trade with separated retailers (rather
than themselves) on the wholesale market. Since they are no longer com-
mitted to serve a speciﬁc amount of retail demand, generators do not face
the risk of rent dissipation, and they thus install smaller capacities than in-
tegrated duopoly generators (k+ > k¤). Proposition 9 indicates that the
investment-enhancing eﬀect of introducing competition is reduced, but not
fully eliminated, by vertically separating the industry (k¤ > km).
Retail Prices
Our next result provides a ranking of the retail prices under the various
market conﬁgurations.
20Proposition 10 (ranking of retail prices) Suppose that (i) capacity de-
cisions are either taken sequentially by the separated generators or that 0 ·
z · 1=3, and (ii) that integrated generators co-ordinate on the pareto-dominant





Proof: Follows from comparing Propositions 1, 3 and 7
Proposition 10 shows that retail prices are highest under integrated duopoly
and lowest under separated duopoly. The integrated monopoly yields an in-
termediate level of retail prices. The intuition for high retail prices under
integrated duopoly parallels that for capacity: Integrated duopoly genera-
tors face the risk of being unable to serve their own demand, which may
be reduced by setting a high retail price (i.e., keeping demand low). This
incentive is absent under both integrated monopoly and separated duopoly.
Also note that retail prices are lowest in the separated duopoly, where retail
competition compresses retail prices.
Welfare
Finally, we consider the welfare levels attained under the various market
conﬁgurations.
Proposition 11 (welfare ranking) Suppose that (i) capacity decisions are
either taken sequentially by the separated generators or that 0 · z · 1=3, and
(ii) that integrated generators co-ordinate on the pareto-dominant competitive





Proof: Since black-outs do not occur irrespective of market conﬁguration,




U(x(r;");")d" ¡ zk; (18)
where k denotes total capacity. Substituting U(x(r;");") from (1), x(r;")
from (2) and plugging in equilibrium values for r and k for each market
conﬁguration yields the associated welfare levels. Comparing these welfare
levels completes the proof.
21Proposition 11 indicates that the combined eﬀects of restructuring on in-
vestments and prices are such that social welfare is highest under separated
duopoly and lowest under integrated duopoly. The integrated monopoly
yields an intermediate level of social welfare. To understand the intuition
for the result, it is important to note that, irrespective of market conﬁgu-
ration, aggregate installed capacity is always large enough to satisfy retail
demand at the relevant retail price, so that blackouts never occur in equi-
librium. This immediately implies that increasing capacity, holding retail
prices constant, increases capacity costs rather than supply security. These
increases in capacity costs must be weighed against the eﬀects of changes
in retail prices for the construction of the welfare ranking. Since both total
capacity and retail prices are higher in the integrated duopoly than in the
successive duopoly, welfare must be lower in the integrated duopoly. The
welfare eﬀect of changing from integrated monopoly to separated duopoly
is less obvious: Total capacity is higher, but retail prices are lower in the
separated duopoly. Proposition 11 shows that the positive eﬀect of lower
retail prices dominates the negative eﬀect higher capacity costs, so that the
separated duopoly performs better than the integrated monopoly.
6.2 Discussion
It is useful to discuss our ﬁndings in light of the literature on vertically related
industries. This literature suggests that vertical separation, combined with
imperfect competition, typically gives rise to a vertical externality problem.
That is, when making strategic pricing or investment decisions, upstream
ﬁrms do not take into account the eﬀect of these decisions on the proﬁts of
downstream ﬁrms (and vice versa). Due to this vertical externality, ﬁrms tend
to set ineﬃciently high (linear) prices,19 and make ineﬃciently low invest-
ments.20 Vertical integration eliminates this externality and thus increases
welfare. The literature also suggests that more intense competition on either
the upstream or the downstream market helps compress mark-ups and in-
crease investment, thereby raising welfare.21 With these results in mind, it is
natural to expect the integrated duopoly to perform best in terms of welfare,
as it combines vertical integration with competition: Capacity investment
19The classic reference is Spengler (1950). Tirole (1989) and Perry (1989) provide sur-
veys of outcomes in vertically related industries. See e.g. Abiru et al. (1998) for a more
recent contribution.
20See, e.g., Buehler et al. (2006).
21For instance, in the extreme case of perfect competition in either the upstream or
downstream market, the vertical externality disappears.
22should be highest, and retail prices should be lowest. Yet, according to the
rankings summarized in Propositions 9–11, this is not the case.
To understand why the standard predictions turn out to be inadequate in
our setting, it is important to note the following crucial diﬀerences to the
literature:
Timing. The timing of upstream and downstream decisions is reversed. In
our setting, it is the retail market that clears in the long run, whereas it is
the wholesale market in the standard literature. This implies, in particu-
lar, that wholesale prices can react to changes in retail prices in our setting,
whereas retail prices cannot react to changes in wholesale prices. There-
fore, increasing the wholesale price merely shifts rents from the retail to the
wholesale market, without aﬀecting the retail price. That is, holding capac-
ity levels constant, increasing the upstream price still has a negative eﬀect
on downstream proﬁts, but leaves total welfare unaﬀected
Unit Price Auction. Upstream prices are determined using a unit price
auction rather than a standard oligopoly or negotiations model. Together
with the reversed timing described above, the unit price auction implies
that integrated duopoly generators face the risk of rent dissipation if they
cannot serve their own retail demand. To avoid this outcome, integrated
duopoly generators are willing to make large capacity investments. This
cannot happen in a standard model with standard timing, because integrated
generators can always increase their retail prices according to the capacity
installed in the upstream production.
Investment Eﬀects. In our setting, higher capacity investments tend to
decrease (rather than increase) welfare. Recall that, in our setting, capac-
ity levels and retail prices are chosen such that blackouts do not occur in
equilibrium. Therefore, changes of market conﬁguration that give rise to
higher levels of capacity do increase generation costs, but leave supply secu-
rity unaﬀected. That is, the only way increases in capacity can positively
aﬀect welfare is over a higher demand that may be served without a black-
out occurring. This does, however, only occur if retail prices decrease as in
the separated duopoly scenario, but not if they increase as in the integrated
duopoly.
7 Conclusion
Employing a novel analytical framework, this paper has examined the com-
petitive eﬀects of restructuring electricity on generating capacity, retail prices,
23and welfare. Our analysis suggests that introducing imperfect competition
into integrated monopoly may not only reduce retail prices, but also increase
investments into generating capacity. Yet, it also highlights that the com-
petitive eﬀects of restructuring rely subtly on vertical market structure. In
particular, our analysis suggests that vertical separation not only reduces the
investment-enhancing eﬀect of introducing competition (without eliminating
it), but also solves the potential rent-dissipation problem associated with the
short-term clearing of wholesale markets and the long-term clearing of retail
markets. In sum, our analysis supports the view that restructuring electricity
may lead to welfare increases.
Future research should generalize our analysis along several lines. First, it
would be interesting to allow for endogenous (and possibly asymmetric) ver-
tical integration decisions, as suggested by Buehler and Schmutzler (2005a)
and Buehler and Schmutzler (2005b). Doing so would enrich our understand-
ing of the ﬁrms’ strategic investment decisions. Second, the discrimination
of non-integrated competitors has rarely been considered in the context of
electricity. Third, it would be instructive to study models where blackouts
may occur with strictly positive probability in equilibrium. Such models
may well predict rather diﬀerent welfare rankings. Finally, it would be use-
ful to study models with diﬀerent mechanisms determining wholesale prices
and with more than two competitors, so that the strong extra investment
incentive generated by the risk of rent dissipation would be mitigated.
Acknowledgements
We want to thank Gregor Zöttl, Nicholas Shunda, Chloé Le Coq, seminar
audiences at Copenhagen University, the University of Groningen and the
University of Utrecht, and conference participants of the CIE Workshop 2006
in Gilleleje, the EARIE 2006 in Amsterdam, the Verein für Socialpolitik 2006
in Bayreuth, the IIOC 2007 in Savannah, the Swiss Society for Economics
and Statistics 2007 in St. Gallen, and the NORIO IV Workshop in Stockholm
2007 for helpful comments and discussions.
24Appendix
A The Derivation of Firm i’s Best Response in
Capacity.





¡zki if ki ¸ 1;
(1 ¡ ki)ki ¡ zki if 0 · ki · 1:
(19)
If 0 · kj < 1 holds, ﬁrm i’s proﬁt function becomes
¦i(ki;kj) =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
1¡kj
2 ¡ zki if ki ¸ 1;
(1¡kj)k2
i






2 + (1 ¡ ki)kikj
i
¡ zki if ki = kj;
(1 ¡ ki)kikj ¡ zki if 0 · ki < kj:
(20)
The best response of ﬁrm i which is derived from maximizing (19) or (20),
respectively, with respect to ki yields
ki(kj) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
1¡z





3 · kj · 1;





for 0 · z · 1=3. If 1=3 < z · 1=2 holds, the maximization of (19) and (20)
with respect to ki results in
ki(kj) =
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
1¡z
2 if kj ¸ 1;
kj¡z
2kj if z · kj · 1;
0 if 1 ¡ 2z · kj · z;
1 if 0 · kj · 1 ¡ 2z:
(22)
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